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Some Introductory Remarks on Embodied 
Cultures and Scenarios for the Times to Come1
Chiara Cappelletto
On the soft fibres of the brain 
is founded the unshakeable base of the soundest 
of Empires. 
Joseph Michel Antoine Servan, Discours sur 
l’Administration de la Justice Criminelle, 1767
It is generally agreed today that the living human body should 
be conceived of as a transcendental, in whose light not only our cog-
nitive activity, our intentionality, and our pathic states but also the 
status of the subject itself must be understood. The human sciences 
have largely adopted a materialist approach (Apter [2016]) and are 
increasingly inclined and able to pursue dialog with the life sciences. 
This convergence of research perspectives suggests a conclusion to 
the long and tempestuous phase of interdisciplinary discussion that 
has characterized the last thirty years of scholarship, during which 
the human sciences, the life sciences, and neuroscience challenged 
one another routinely before finally settling on a common area of 
inquiry under the umbrella of “embodiment.”
The notion of embodiment is implicated in any stance that more 
or less openly opposes the mind-body dualism or that subsumes this 
dualism in the nature-culture polarity, thus turning an epistemologi-
cal and ontological question into an anthropological one. It is, at the 
same time, a notion compatible with a wide variety of approaches. 
It admits the possibility of considering the body both as a substra-
tum onto which thoughts and artifacts that complement it are graft-
1 The essays collected here take up and expand on the topic discussed at the 
international conference Bodies and Cultures: How We Become Ourselves, co-
hosted by me and Carmine Di Martino, which took place on May 17 and 18, 
2017, at the University of Milan and the Milan Natural History Museum. 
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ed, allowing it to realize its full potential, and as 
a live constraint that can (or must) be mastered 
and from which one can be emancipated by vir-
tue of intelligence and technology. The selection of 
the body as a condition of possibility and think-
ability for the humanity of our life need not, how-
ever, entail any claims to its superiority. That is, 
we must not repeat the same move that modern 
philosophy made with the mind by valorizing it—
epistemically, heuristically, cognitively…
The set of disciplines that take the process-
es of embodiment as a common denominator is 
prompting aesthetics—itself finally free of “gno-
seological inferiority”—to rethink its own grounds 
and aims, and to extend its field of inquiry to 
the point of a fruitful dialog with philosophi-
cal anthropology, cognitivism, neuroscience, and 
media and cultural studies. The three «funda-
mental anthropological laws» set out by Helmuth 
Plessner (1928), the idea of «freedom from bod-
ily limits» put forward by Paul Alsberg (1922), 
and the notion of «techno-aesthetics» drawn up 
by Gilbert Simondon (1982), along with the inter-
pretation that John Dewey proposed of pragma-
tism (1925), are fully integrated into the current 
aesthetic debate, which also benefits from the 
viewpoints of more recent authors, such as Anto-
nio Damasio (1994), Shaun Gallager (2005), Erika 
Fisher-Lichte (2008), Alva Noë (2009), Lambros 
Malafouris (2013), Tim Ingold (2013), and Vit-
torio Gallese (2020), among others. These multi-
disciplinary grafts are but symptoms of the wide-
spread need for a fundamental renegotiation of 
what exactly constitutes the humanity of human 
beings, at a time when the «dark foreboding dan-
ger [scil. overshadowing] life,» which Ernst Jünger 
sensed almost a century ago (1934: 3), is consub-
stantial with the very idea of the Anthropocene. 
It seems to me that to meet this need we must 
accept the thesis—deemed «self-evident» by Pietro 
Montani in the pages that follow—whereby «the 
forms of life with which the genus homo experi-
mented in the course of its evolution are primar-
ily characterized by a set of practices related to 
its specific technical creativity.» It is therefore not 
possible to discuss the question of embodiment 
without considering the now widely-held position 
that human history is a «continuum of human-
prostheses inter-relations» (Ihde-Malafouris 
[2019]: 196), although the locations of the  cut-off 
points between such open-ended practices remain 
to be established (Barad [2003]).
The convictions that, as Carmine Di Martino 
writes, «technology is separable neither from the 
rough course of the hominization of the indi-
viduals (phylogeny) who make up the species 
homo sapiens nor from that of their humaniza-
tion (ontogeny),» and the processes of embodi-
ment remain incomprehensible if this inseparabil-
ity is not taken into account, are not based on the 
results of theoretical and experimental research 
alone. In my view, the fact that the body is con-
ceived of as the original cognitive and sensible 
agent insofar as it is rooted in a world scene that 
it manipulates, and no longer as an obstacle to 
the whole affirmation of our human nature, rep-
resents the final and fullest affirmation of biopoli-
tics. This development stands to influence not 
only economic choices and institutional practices 
but also the very critical thought devoted to find-
ing the best strategies of what I would call “body 
management,” to the point of finding surrogates 
for our living organism when the body’s perfor-
mance is not fulfilling. Bruno Bonnell, the former 
director of Infogrames/Atari, predicts that the first 
soccer game between humans and robots will be 
played in 2050, with the victory going to the lat-
ter (Blouin [2011]: 34). Widespread AI is the next 
step on the road after that. 
The current alliance between criticism and 
special interests from the industrial, pharmaceuti-
cal, military, and entertainment spheres, is so pro-
nounced that the “body turn” currently at hand is 
in jeopardy of repeating those logics of domina-
tion that it actually means to deconstruct. It runs 
the risk of reducing the qualitative richness of 
plural bodies and (contradictory) individual sen-
sible experiences to statistical data and predictive 
hypotheses tailored to “standard” neurobiologi-
cal and anatomic mechanisms, so as to map out a 
paradoxically idealist notion of the body, whereby 
“a body as such” exists.
5Some Introductory Remarks on Embodied Cultures and Scenarios for the Times to Come
To unmask the ideology of such an idealism, it 
is useful to recall that the relationship between life 
and technology, and its impact on the evolution 
of human beings, has a history, which is not lin-
ear and incremental (Corbin, Courtine, Vigarello 
[2005]). Introducing this history into the debate, 
for instance, by reflecting on the co-dependence 
of matter, imagination, and machines, as Barbara 
Grespi does further ahead, makes it possible to 
resist the homologating effect of the rearview mir-
ror while implying that no teleology is legitimate. 
Even more to the point, it presents the body as a 
theoretical object where epistemic outlooks and 
political plans participate in ongoing processes of 
becoming, rather than as the last resort for finding 
an answer to long-standing questions about iden-
tity, cognition, and the purposiveness of life. The 
current neo-animist shift itself prompts a reconcep-
tualization of the idea of the human body-mind as 
coextensive with the physical, social, and cultural 
environment, revealing the significance of pros-
thetic and technological dilations attached to adapt-
able biological beings, and therefore of the impact 
of goods, products, and lifestyles introduced by 
empires old and new. If our inherent plasticity res-
cues us from a biologically deterministic fate, it also 
makes us a favored site for projection, manipula-
tion, and product placement (Bahri [2017]: 6). 
Any investigation of the body as a mate-
rial apriori must thus be inscribed in the wake 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as much as in that of 
Frantz Fanon. 
Gender studies and, above all, Judith Butler 
have long been committed to exposing the nor-
mative and conservative character of a notion 
of Body that neglects the phenomenology and 
power games entailed thereby. In looking back 
on her idea of the “construction” of identity, But-
ler has stated: «Basically, I am saying that a body 
emerges in the world in a state of dependence 
with respect to other bodies and institutions, and 
that as a consequence, the body is “outside of 
itself ” and in the social in order to exist, in order 
to survive» (Butler [2011]: 86). Yet, the idea that 
the body is exposed to practices—including those 
of a juridical, medical, pedagogical, reproductive, 
athletic, culinary, ornamental, and ritual nature—
that shape it, seems to me to come too late. Of 
course the body’s situatedness is expressed in pro-
cesses and metamorphoses influenced by dynam-
ics of domination to which it contributes in turn 
and that enable it to meet the demands of an 
ever-greater identitary articulation—male versus 
female, young versus old, white versus non-white, 
cisgender versus transgender—better than a uni-
versal mind could do. But this plasticity does not 
guarantee that every individual is recognized as 
determined. Invoking the plasticity of an embod-
ied mind does not suffice to exhaust the question 
of the processes of individuation. On the con-
trary, individuals can—once again—be placed in 
the service of the One: Jean-Francois Toussaint, 
in collaboration with the IRMES, has determined 
that “the” human body will reach its peak athlet-
ic power in 2060. It is then to compensate for the 
fact that the athletic body is ineluctably doomed 
to exhaust its own potential that more and more 
space is given to the Paralympics, whose contest-
ants have a greater margin of improvement in 
their competitive results than able-bodied subjects 
(Blouin [2011]: 25 and 31).
The question is how human bodies trigger, 
partake in, and/or direct the reflexive processes 
carried out by subjects in environments that are 
always already inhabited by other living and arti-
factual bodies, and within what limits they can 
and should realize their own “technical creativity,” 
knowing that this opens the door to new mate-
rial possibilities but also to the destruction of the 
same. The question is thus in fact an eminent-
ly aesthetic one. If we insist on the reflexive and 
autopoietic capacity of the body, the variety of its 
forms and their evolution will no longer stand out 
as exploitations of the norm but as variations of a 
type whose “naturalness” is the result of an origi-
nal collaboration between organisms and tools. 
Resisting the intellectual partisanship between 
apologetics and apocalyptics about the co-depend-
ence of humans and technology, our present dis-
cussion therefore sets its sights on the legality gov-
erning the imbrication of bodies and prostheses.
Whereas in the human type that was being 
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developed at the beginning of the 20th centu-
ry, and that has since come into its own, Jünger 
detected «the presence of a “second” conscious-
ness» that «reveals itself in the ever-increasing 
ability to see oneself as an object. […] [For w]e 
are not only the first creatures to work with arti-
ficial limbs; through the use of artificial limbs we 
also find ourselves in the process of erecting unu-
sual realms with a high degree of accord between 
man and machine» (Jünger [1934]: 14), in The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduc-
tion, Walter Benjamin hints at a similar kind of 
«accord», which we would describe today in per-
formative terms. Countering the idea that humans 
are passively subjected to artifacts and their 
codes, he draws a distinction between a «first» 
and a «second technology»: «The first technology 
[which, scil., «made the maximum possible use of 
human beings»] really sought to master nature, 
whereas the second [which, scil., «reduces their 
use to the minimum»] aims rather at an interplay 
between nature and humanity» (Benjamin [1935]: 
107). The second technology—which we are cur-
rently experiencing—originates where «human 
beings first began to distance themselves from 
nature» (Benjamin [1935]: 107)—that is, from 
their biological givenness. 
Understanding this distance is crucial to 
clarifying the reach of the notion of embodi-
ment, which renders the distinction between an 
environment outside the anatomical boundaries 
of the human body and an environment inside 
these boundaries inadequate. Elsa Dorlin rightly 
observes, for example, that «masculine and femi-
nine, taken as so-called “natural” identities, are 
products of Bayer, Sanofi-Aventis and Pfizer-
Wyeth» (Dorlin [2011]: 18). This elision of bor-
ders means not only that—as Elisa Binda and Dar-
io Cecchi, respectively, write in the present issue—
«the [scil. human] body itself becomes an inter-
face, a medium, that is performatively engaged in 
commerce with the things around it,» and that 
«the human body manifests [scil. the tendency] 
to be prolongated by technological proxies», but 
also that, in the words of Roberto Redaelli, «it is 
necessary to rethink the relationship between the 
apriori and material level, starting from the nor-
mativity inherent to the sphere of aisthesis», since 
the mediality of the body is not a biologically neu-
tral given. 
It seems to me that this rethinking must start 
from a discussion of the polarity of endo and exo-
somatization, of internalization and externaliza-
tion, which makes Montani’s and Ian Tattersall’s 
focus on the emergence of language as an «exter-
nalized attribute,» whose corporeality is certainly 
not reducible to its thinghood, and whose mean-
ingfulness is not reducible to its discursivity, all 
the more relevant. This polarity plays a part in the 
feedback movement produced by such attributes—
a broad movement encompassing senses and 
feelings, which, as Cecchi stresses, «enhance the 
exchange with the surrounding world» through 
being, in Montani’s terms, «technically attuned». 
It would therefore be apt to investigate new 
possibilities for conceptualizing the human form at 
the precise moment in which it is taken as becom-
ing—that is, as genetically artificial. This could ena-
ble us to understand the technological device, not 
as a tool that is in itself special by virtue of extra-
natural powers, but as a pharmakon, the quality 
of whose effects depends on the quantity and the 
modes of administration, and includes unforeseen 
secondary effects as well as achievements and fail-
ures that may or may not have occurred or occur 
in the future. I therefore subscribe to the incisive 
claim put forth by Tattersall in his valued contribu-
tion to the present issue: admitting the possibility 
that there were elements of chance in our becom-
ing what we are, he contends that «we are opti-
mized for nothing, and thereby not condemned to 
be anything». One thinks of the Speedo and Jaked 
01 swimsuits, used since the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 
which make it easier to float so that swimmers can 
limit their exertion to thrust and speed by reduc-
ing the impact of muscle mass (Blouin [2001]: 29). 
«Technology is our uniform», writes Jünger (Jünger 
[1934]: 11). How exactly we wear it is the crux of 
the matter. 
There are two possible roads here. Either we 
opt for the binary choice whereby technology 
functions as a mask that at degree zero assimilates 
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individual identities and at its maximum degree 
diversifies them through hyperspecialization; or, 
we interpret the significance of technology’s inter-
vention in life as an expression of the fact that the 
body is a medium—that is, a mode of organizing 
intentional and unintentional processes. In this 
second case, the human being is not a variable of 
technology but a technical agent, and imagina-
tion—not the effectiveness of the tool or the use-
fulness of the result—plays a privileged role in our 
embodied cultural formation. «Thanks to a long 
series of externalized experiences», the imagina-
tion is able to «gradually achieve […] a self-con-
sciousness of its articulatory function» (Montani). 
This ongoing achievement is at the core of any 
inquiry about the living body. 
Finally, the abandonment of the idea of bio-
logical givenness has three orders of consequences 
that deserve to be further investigated. The first 
is on the order of substance. Taking the body as 
transcendental does not imply thinking of the 
human being as the inevitable result of the activa-
tion of neuro-anatomical mechanisms conditioned 
by the environment. On the contrary, the very fact 
of culturally qualifying our innate readiness to 
action when we encounter inorganic matter allows 
us to reflect on the original self-alienation of the 
human animal, on its eccentricity, and on its free-
dom. In order to understand the reach of a self-
experience that is genetically vicarious, indebted 
to the technical devices whereby human beings 
are co-constituted, it is necessary to refine the 
investigation of embodied cultural practices and 
to assume a heterological point of view. This is the 
same point of view that runs through the pages of 
A Cyborg Manifesto by Donna J. Haraway (1985), 
of the less well-known Postcolonial Biology by 
Deepika Bahri (2017), and of certain recent stud-
ies on pregnancy—deserving of attention from 
contemporary academic aesthetics—that focus 
on the natural situated condition during which 
the pregnant subject has a salient and develop-
ing experience of her own duality (Young [1984], 
Depraz [2003]).
The other two sets of problems are methodo-
logical in nature. In order to think the body heter-
ologically, it is useful to reason by way of simula-
tion, outlining “scenarios”—as Tattersall does here. 
The idea of the scenario updates that of the tradi-
tional “thought experiment” by better adapting it 
to research in which scholars are required to form 
hypotheses about recurring behavioral patterns in 
a variety of contexts and cultural habits but that 
does not dispense with empirical evidence and 
historical sources. This methodological choice is 
exemplified in the work of Richard D. Alexander, 
who makes use of the notion of «surrogate scenar-
io-building» in his research on human behavioral 
evolution (1989), and Vilayanur Ramachandran, 
who considers art to be «nature’s own virtual real-
ity» in his neuroaesthetic studies ([2011]: 243). 
In order to operationalize the notion of sce-
nario, we need to bring up that of performance, 
as used first by Simondon, and later by Malafouris 
(unfortunately without citing the former). In 
L’Individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et 
d’information, the French philosopher begins his 
reflection on individuation with the example of 
the production of a clay brick, which entails more 
than the mere application of a rectangular shape 
to passive matter (2005). This discrete and specific 
artifact comes into being through the intentional 
manipulation of a given material, which expresses 
its own possibilities thanks to the involvement of a 
particular human being, whose contingent action 
is in turn shaped by that clay. In Creative thinging 
Malafouris calls attention to «the feeling of and 
for clay,» referring specifically to the «dynamical 
process of creative material engagement, wherein 
material and human agency are coupled to each 
other and allow action to gain a “life of its own”» 
(2014: 151). As not all actions are performative, 
such a coupling of natural element and human 
intervention must be held mandatory in order to 
understand life as a historical performing process 
in itself.
The arguments that I am proposing here find 
support in the essays by Grespi and Christoph 
Wulf, the second of which has the merit of link-
ing culture to sociality, allowing us to understand 
the former not as a mere knowing (how to make) 
but as a situated and relational know-how. Perfor-
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mances—which intervene in external objects and 
in the living body itself—are in no way a repro-
ductive but rather a productive activity that pro-
poses “altered” versions of the initially available 
model: independent variations on the theme. Thus, 
as Wulf claims, «while maintaining continuity», 
performances «also offer scope for discontinuity» 
such that «alterity is conveyed through performa-
tivity.» “Conveying” is produced by a broader set 
of technical-corporeal gestures. These types of ges-
tures govern the ways in which each body acts in 
its own environment. This is why «the gesture,» 
as Grespi writes, «is no longer [to be conceived 
of as] an involuntary, corporeal manifestation of 
emotional states, but rather an interface between a 
subject and the world, a creative form of thought 
that rejects both rationality and the dimension 
of the drive.» The historicity of man is ultimately 
expressed through a series of practices that inter-
act, challenging the very idea of human “evolution”.
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This issue of Aisthesis is enriched by a focus 
on Florens Christian Rang, William Shakespeare, 
and Walter Benjamin. Marina Montanelli pre-
sents here for the first time an Italian translation 
of Rang’s Vom Weg messianischer Deutung (On the 
Way of Messianic Interpretation), the introductory 
essay to his work on Shakespeare’s sonnets. The 
translation is accompanied by Montanelli’s com-
ment paper on Rang’s text, Florens der Christ. Un 
commento a La via dell’interpretazione messianica 
di Florens Christian Rang. This paper aims both at 
contextualizing the figure of Rang and his work 
on Shakespeare and at addressing the most impor-
tant conceptual issues of messianic interpretation, 
work of art, and faith work that Rang’s essay pre-
sents. Fabrizio Desideri’s paper, Hamlet or Europe 
and the end of modern Trauerspiel. On some 
Shakespearean motifs in Walter Benjamin, deals 
with the possibility of interpreting Hamlet’s time 
as the time of an “interim” in light of the claims 
Benjamin makes about Shakespeare’s drama in 
his book on the German Trauerspiel. Taking into 
account the interpretations of Pavel Florensky, 
Lev S. Vygotsky and Carl Schmitt, Desideri shows 
how Benjamin’s characterization of Hamlet reveals 
something about the nature of modern conscious-
ness and the aporetic character of modern politics. 
Lastly, Alice Barale’s «Unbewaffnetes Auge»: Ben-
jamin’s interpretation of comedy in Shakespeare 
and Molière examines two early works by Walter 
Benjamin on Shakespeare’s comedy As you like it 
and on Molière’s Le malade imaginaire. The paper 
deals with the role of the comic within Benjamin’s 
philosophy, including in its relationship to mourn-
ing and what Benjamin writes about it in The Ori-
gin of German Tragic Drama.
